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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v -
JOHN FRANCIS MCKENNA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860158 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of Aggravated 
Assault, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-103 (1953, as amended), in a jury trial held October 21-22, 
1985, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding. 
Judge Conder sentenced defendant on March 31, 1986 to two 
concurrent terms of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 7:00 a.m. on the morning of August 21, 1985, the 
defendant knocked on the door of his estranged wife's home (T. 8, 
96). Mrs. McKenna had been separated from defendant for six 
months (Tr. 6), and had been residing with Mr. Steve Lujan (Tr. 
6, 35). Mrs. McKenna answered the door, told defendant that he 
should have called prior to coming to the house, and asked 
defendant to leave (Tr. 8, 9, 96). Whereupon defendant stated, 
"That means you have company, huh? Ifll kill him." (Tr. 9). 
Defendant ran downstairs and grabbed a pistol out of his truck 
(Tr. 9, 98); Mrs. McKenna went to the phone to call the police 
when defendant ran into the house, grabbed the telephone from 
Mrs. McKenna and threw it on the table (Tr. 9, 10, 100, 119). 
Defendant went directly into Mrs. McKenna's bedroom (Tr. 11, 
100), and found Mr. Lujan lying on the floor (Tr. 102). 
Defendant began to hit and kick Mr. Lujan and pointed the gun at 
him and told him to "get up." (Tr. 102). The defendant then 
forced Mr. Lujan out of the house threatening him with the gun 
(Tr. 11, 70). Mr. Lujan went to a neighboring house and called 
the police (Tr. 70, 71). 
Defendant stood at the living room window watching for 
Mr. Lujan, and stated at trial "I was just looking for an excuse 
to shoot that sucker at that time. I was pretty angry, 
especially when she was..." (Tr. 107). Mrs. McKenna and 
defendant then began to argue and defendant continuously hit her 
in the back of the head with the gun while threatening to kill 
her (Tr. 12, 13, 107-08,). Defendant further kicked Mrs. McKenna 
in the stomach and pushed her onto the couch (Tr. 13, 108). 
During the argument, Mrs. McKenna was shot in the 
shoulder (Tr. 15, 16). She testified that after Defendant pushed 
her onto the couch he pointed the gun at her face and she slapped 
the gun away as the gun discharged (Tr. 15, 16). Defendant 
testified that he put the gun to his own head and Mrs. McKenna 
grabbed his arm as the gun discharged (Tr. .109). After wounding 
Mrs. McKenna, defendant called an ambulance (Tr. 21) but 
continued to hit her with the gun, pushing her against the wall 
(Tr. 18, 27). Mrs. McKenna was treated for the gunshot wound and 
also required stitches to the back of her head (Tr. 22). 
Both defendan: n^*. M:. McKenna testified that Mrs.. 
Me Ken ltd Linn] M M ohili. :» separate residence from 
the defendant three i: ^  : . .  piici 1< tr ;i-rident 
and that divorce proceedings had been initiated ' ;. -*< . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly refused t- . r:.sti«.;t the jury 
on the defense ox habitatic- v- evidence a* :i:a] indicated 
that defendant was n - ... - -* -* ^  v --*> dt. I he 
time < -" the incident and further", that t:i**~ ,.-^ :,or. j,, unlawful 
f:,ntr :" - - , defendant failed to prove that deadly force was 
necessary to prevent the felony of lagainy. 
Th< trial court acted within its discretion :r 
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possibility of rehabilitation ^ u.e seriousness :-
 t< 
and concluded that the best environment for defendant was a 
pr ison se tti rig. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE DEFENSE OF HABITATION SINCE 
THERE WAS NO REASONABLE BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE. 
Defendant claims ;:• - :"a] r-^ r^4- e r r ^ in refusing to 
inst; .z* t:v lefense of habitation under Utah Code 
Mn < .• , • i ! . r 
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 commission O L the felony ol Digamy. 
Section 76-2-40 5 provides: 
(1) A person is justified in using force 
against another when to the extent that he 
reasonably believes that the force is necess-
ary to prevent or terminate the otherfs unlaw-
ful entry into or attack upon his habitation: 
however, he is justified in the use of force 
which is intended or likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a 
violent and tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, 
or by stealth, and he reasonably believes that 
the entry is attempted or made for the purpose 
of assaulting or offering personal violence 
to any person, dwelling, or being in the habi-
tation and he reasonably believes that the 
force is necessary to prevent the assault or 
offer of personal violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry 
is made or attempted for the purpose of 
committing a felony in the habitation and 
that the force is necessary to prevent the 
commission of the felony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force 
in defense of habitation is presumed for the 
purpose of both civil and xriminal cases to 
have acted reasonably and had a reasonable 
fear of imminent peril of death or serious 
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry 
is unlawful and is made or attempted by use 
of force, or in a violent and tumultuous 
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or 
for the purpose of committing a felony. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Before the statute is applicable, the entry must be 
unlawful; thus, the defense of habitation is limited to those 
cases where a defendant is attempting to prevent a forcible or 
unlawful entry into his home. 
In State v. Dock, 585 P.2d 56 (Utah 1978), decided 
under § 76-2-405 prior to the amendment of the statute, this 
Court affirmed the trial courtfs refusal to give a defense of 
habitation jury instruction.1 There, this Court found that no 
evidence existed that the entry was unlawful or violent and thus 
the denial of the instruction was proper. See also State v. 
McLaurin, 266 S.E.2d 406, 408 (N.C.App. 1980). Further, 
defendant may not assert the defense where the victim enters the 
premises lawfully, but subsequently engages in unlawful conduct. 
People v. Chapman, 49 Ill.App.3d 553, 7 111.Dec. 416, 364 N.E.2d 
577 (1977); People v. Brown, 19 Ill.App.3d 757, 312 N.E.2d 789 
(1974) . 
Utah Code Ann. 76-2-405 (1953) is substantively similar 
to the defense of habitation statutes in Montana and Illinois. 
Those states have interpreted their statutes as requiring that 
the entry must be unlawful before the defense statute is 
applicable. State v. Sorensen, 619 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1980); 
People v. Chapman, 49 Ill.App.3d 553, 7 111.Dec. 416, 364 N.E.2d 
577 (1977) . An unlawful entry occurs when: 
A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in 
or upon premises when the premises or any 
portion thereof at the time of the entry or 
remaining are not open to the public and when 
the actor is not otherwise licensed or priv-
ileged to enter or remain on the premises or 
such portion thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3) (1953, as amdended) 
There is strong social interest in preventing any 
unlawful entry of the dwelling and the dweller is privileged to 
use reasonable nondeadly force in the effort to prevent such an 
1
 Although § 76-2-40 5 has been amended since Dock, the provision 
in § 76-2-405 relied upon by this Court in Dock is substantially 
the same as the amended version of § 76-2-40 5. 
entry. However, the privilege to use deadly force to prevent an 
unlawful entry of the dwelling is limited to cases of entry with 
the specific intent to commit a felony and does not apply to an 
entry attempted for the mere purpose of making a personal assault 
which is neither intended nor likely to kill or to inflict great 
bodily injury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405(1) (b)(1985); Carroll v. 
State. 23 Ala. 28 (1853); State v. Countryman, 57 Kan. 815, 48 P. 
137 (1897); State v. Tavlor, 143 Mo. 150, 165 (1898). The 
statutory authority to use force to prevent or terminate an 
unlawful entry, has no application to a lawful entry, even if the 
entrant later engaged in unlawful conduct. State v. Sorenson, 
619 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1980). .See also W. LaFave and H. Scott, 
Jr., Criminal Law § 55 (1972 ed.). 
In the case at bar, the defendant requests this Court 
to find that he was justified in using force to terminate the 
commission of a felony within a habitation he was authorized to 
defend, under § 76-2-405(1) (b) . Before this Court can reach § 
76-2-405(1)(b), it is necessary for this Court to find under § 
76-2-405(1) that: 1) The defendant was residing with Mrs. 
McKenna, and 2) Mr. Lujan unlawfully entered the defendant's 
habitation. 
First, the defendant was not residing with Mrs. 
McKenna. The State acknowledges that the defense of habitation 
statute includes not only a person's actual residence, but 
whatever place he may be occupying. State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 
1120f 1122 (Utah 1977) .2 However, the record clearly indicates 
that defendant did not reside with Mrs. McKenna at 550 West 400 
North nor was he invited onto the premises (Tr. 6, 94). The 
parties maintained separate residences for five or six months 
prior to August 21, 1985 (Tr. 6). Although the parties may have 
lived together for approximately a ten-day period around the 7th 
of August (Tr. 94), defendant was not residing at the house on 
August 21, 1985 and was not authorized to be at the house (Tr. 
7). Thus, the defense of habitation statute was not available to 
defendant, since he was not defending his habitation. 
Second, assuming this Court finds the defendant was 
residing with Mrs. McKenna, this Court must then find that Mr. 
Lujan unlawfully entered the premises. The defendant knew that 
Mrs. McKenna had invited Mr. Lujan into her home (Tr. 99). 
Although Mr. Lujan may have engaged in felonious conduct after 
his lawful entry, § 405 justifies the use of force only to 
prevent an unlawful entry. See also State v. Sorensen, 619 P.2d 
1185 (Mont. 1980). Thus, once Mr. Lujan lawfully entered the 
premises, the defense was inapplicable. 
Finally, assuming the defendant did reside with Mrs. 
McKenna, and Mr. Lujan's entry was unlawful, § 76-2-405(1) (b) 
justifies the use of deadly force when the occupant reasonably 
believes the use of force is necessary to prevent the commission 
of a felony. Defendant has offered no proof that deadly force 
1
 Although § 76-2-40 5 was amended after Mitcheson, the amendment 
does not appear to affect the definition of habitation in 
Mitcheson. 
was necessary to prevent the felony of bigamy. In fact, when 
defendant went to Mrs. McKenna's house on August 21, 1985, she 
did not request his assistance but asked him to leave (Tr. 9), to 
which the defendant responded "That means you have company, huh? 
I'll kill him." (Tr. 9). Mr. Lujan did not threaten defendant in 
any manner (Tr. 102, 123), and when defendant kicked Mr. Lujan in 
the ribs and hit him in the head, Mr. Lujan did not resist (Tr. 
103, 123). Although defendant asserted that he was trying to 
prevent open fornication in front of his children (App. Br. 8, 
Tr. 99), defendant further testified that the children usually 
slept in their bedroom and that he did not know the children were 
sleeping in the living room until after defendant got the gun 
(Tr. 121). Thus, defendant did not know if the children had 
witnessed any sexual acts until after he got his gun (Tr. 121). 
Defendant asserts he was justified in using force to 
prevent the commission of a felony; however, once Mr. Lujan left 
the residence the defendant proceeded to slap Mrs. McKenna and 
strike her in the head with the gun (Tr. 11, 12). He also 
pointed the gun at Mrs. McKenna and threatened to kill her (Tr. 
12). Defendant asserts, under the defense of habitation statute, 
that he was justified in threatening Mrs. McKenna with the gun 
because she attacked him (App. Br. 12). Again, before this 
argument can be addressed, this Court must necessarily find that 
defendant was a resident of the home at 550 West 400 North, Salt 
Lake City, and thus, had the right to defend his residence. 
However, it is clear that defendant did not reside at 550 West 
400 North (Tr. 6, 94). Even assuming the defendant did reside at 
this address, where both the antagonist and the assailed are 
legal occupants of the same residence, neither one having the 
right to eject the other, the defense of habitation is 
inapplicable. Conner v. State. 361 So.2d 774 (Fla. App. 1978). 
Defendant strongly argues that under State v. 
Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977) he was authorized to use 
force in defense of his home. There, the defendant visited his 
sister1s home and this Court found that this was enough to 
authorize him to defend the habitation with deadly force. 
Clearly, the defendant in the case at bar was not occupying the 
residence at 550 West 400 North (Tr. 6, 94) and further, 
defendant was not authorized or invited onto the premises (Tr. 
6) . 
Finally, defendant asserts that a reasonable basis in 
the evidence existed to support the defendant's theory of defense 
of habitation and the trial court erred in not permitting a jury 
instruction on this defense. 
The burden of showing error in a jury instruction is on 
the party who seeks to upset the judgment. State v. Noren, 740 
P.2d 568 (Utah 1985). The defendant has failed to show any 
error. 
A defendant's entitlement to a jury instruction on his 
theory of the case is not absolute. It is conditioned upon the 
existence of a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the 
giving of the proposed instruction. State v. Eagle# 611 P.2d 
1211, 1213 (Utah 1980). The guidelines as to whether or not a 
jury instruction should be given are as follows: 
If the defendant's evidence, although in 
material conflict with the State's proofr be 
such that the jury may entertain a reason-
able doubt as to whether or not he acted in 
self-defense, he is entitled to have the 
jury instructed fully and clearly on the 
law of self-defense. Conversely, if all 
reasonable men must conclude that the 
evidence is so slight as to be incapable of 
raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's 
mind as to whether a defendant accused of 
a crime acted in self-defense, tendered 
instructions thereon are properly refused. 
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265-66 (Utah 1980) citing State v. 
Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (1969). See also 
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981). In the case at bar 
the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the 
defense of habitation since no reasonable basis in the evidence 
justified the giving of the proposed instruction. See pp. 3-8 
supra. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION 
IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT. 
Defendant claims that the trial court gave inordinate 
weight to defendant's prior arrest record in imposing a prison 
sentence, and thus defendant was denied due process. 
Defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104(3) 
(1953) as amended, provides that the sentencing authority must 
recognize and carefully consider the possibilities of 
rehabilitation of an individual offender when deciding the 
appropriate penalty (App. Br. 16). However, § 76-1-104(3) also 
provides that the judge prescribe penalties which are 
proportionate to the seriousness of the offenses. 
Section 76-1-104(3) (1953) provides: 
The provisions of this code shall be con-
strued in accordance with these general 
purposes. . • 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are propor-
tionate to the seriousness of offenses and 
which permit recognition or differences in 
rehabilitation possibilities among individual 
offenders. 
The sentence imposed by a trial judge will not be 
disturbed, unless it is in excess of his authority or there is an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 1981). 
This Court has stated that before it would overturn the sentence 
imposed by the trial court, "it must be clear that the actions of 
the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of 
discretion." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
See also State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984). 
Prior to sentencing the defendant, the lower court 
ordered a presentence report (Tr. 199). This report included the 
defendant's version of the incident leading to defendant's 
arrest, the victim's statement, and other background information 
on the defendant including his prior criminal record, his marital 
and educational background and his employment history (R. 361-
369). It is clear from the presentence report that the 
investigator did not solely rely upon defendant's prior arrest 
record in making his recommendation but also considered the 
seriousness of the offense and the possibility of rehabilitation. 
The investigator expressed concern in the following areas: 
defendant's serious alcohol problems, the defendant's use of a 
firearm in the offense, the fact that victims suffered bodily 
injury, and the defendant's disregard for the law (R. 369). 
At the original sentencing hearing on December 6, 1985, 
defendant's counsel expressed concern to the reference in the 
presentence report to the defendant's prior record, and went into 
an in-depth discussion of defendant's past history (Tr. 201-206). 
At defendant's request, the trial court ordered him to undergo a 
ninety-day diagnostic evaluation (Tr. 209). 
The diagnostic reports indicated that if the defendant 
were left in the community, there would be a significant 
probability that he would commit more offenses, and that the most 
appropriate place for him to deal with his problems is within the 
prison setting (Supp. R. 5). 
At the time of sentencing on March 3, 1986, the court 
heard argument as to whether defendant should be placed into a 
substance abuse program (Tr. 210-217, 219-220) and defense 
counsel again explained defendant's prior criminal record (Tr. 
214-217) . The lower court additionally elicited testimony from 
the defendant concerning his susbstance abuse history (Tr. 220-
223) . 
Before pronouncing sentence, the court stated, "The 
charge with which you are charged here is a serious offense: the 
use of a firearm in my mind is always a very serious offense." 
(T. 223). The court then sentenced defendant to not less than 
zero to five years on Count I and not less than zero to five 
years on Count II in the Utah State Penitentiary. The Court 
further recommended that the defendant receive treatment for 
alcohol and drug abuse (Tr. 223-224). 
The defendant suggests that the lower court improperly 
relied on the defendants prior arrest record in imposing a 
prison sentence. This Court recently held in State v. Sweat, 31 
Utah Adv. Rep. 29, P.2d (April 8, 1986) that so long as 
basic constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural 
fairness are afforded, the trial court has broad discretion in 
considering any and all information that reasonably may bear on 
the proper sentence. 
In the case at barf the judge made his decision based 
upon the information in the presentence report and the 90 day 
diagnostic report that defendant had a history of chronic alcohol 
abuse and a violent personality, and further, that defendant used 
a firearm in the offense. CIearlyf defendant's sentence was not 
based solely upon his arrest record. The record as a whole 
establishes that the defendant was not denied his due process 
rights and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion such that 
this court should overturn the sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant's conviction 
and sentencing should be affirmed. 
DATED this J? f day of September, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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